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Abstract: 
The product lifecycle model can be understood as a three-stage model of technological development 
associated with a particular product technology. In the explorative stage many different designs are 
developed, in the development stage products become standardized into a dominant design, and in 
the mature stage only incremental changes occur within the dominant design. Although the product 
lifecycle model is widely accepted and often applied in empirical research, innovation scholars have 
failed to develop systematic theoretical models that explain the different stages of technological 
development along the lifecycle. In this study, an attempt is made to contribute to product lifecycle 
theory by developing a theoretical model based on percolation dynamics. The model combines the 
concept of increasing returns to adoption with information diffusion among consumers within social 
networks. The main contribution of the model is that it replicates the three stages of the product 
lifecycle as an outcome of a single elementary process. The model also replicates the S-shaped 
diffusion curve and the occurrence of an industry shakeout. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The product lifecycle model and the concept of dominant design have received a great deal of 
scholarly attention in industrial organisation and innovation studies for over three decades. 
Since Abernathy and Utterback (1978) first developed the concept of a dominant design from 
a study of the automobile industry, scholars have found the concept to be a useful tool for 
studying the evolution of products. Related concepts such as natural trajectories, technological 
paradigms and technological guideposts (Nelson and Winter 1977, Dosi 1982, and Sahal 1985, 
respectively) have also become central concepts in the innovation literature.  
 
The  product  lifecycle  model  can  be  understood  as  a  three-stage  model  of  technological 
development associated with a particular product technology. In the first, explorative, stage 
product  innovation  is  dominant  as  many  firms  explore  the  new  technology  in  various 
directions. During the development stage, standardization on a dominant design causes a fall 
in  product  innovation  and  opens  the  way  for  increased  mechanization  of  the  production 
process. During this stage, many firms are forced to exit the industry, causing a ‘shake-out’ 
(Klepper 1997). Finally, in the mature stage, only incremental innovations occur within the 
dominant  design  to  customize  the  product  for  specific  user  groups.  A  new  cycle  may  be 
initiated by the introduction of a radically new technology.  
 
Though  the  product  lifecycle  model  is  widely  accepted  and  often  applied  in  empirical 
research, innovation scholars have failed to develop systematic theoretical models that explain 
the  different  stages  of  technological  development  along  the  lifecycle.  Exceptions  are  the 
industrial dynamics models that have focused on the shake-out leading to the emergence of an 
oligopoly  (Jovanovic  and MacDonald  1994;  Klepper  1996). Yet, these ‘industry  lifecycle’ 
models remain silent on the innovation dynamics that occur during the product lifecycle.  
   4 
In this study, an attempt is made to contribute to the product lifecycle theory by developing a 
theoretical  model  based  on  percolation  dynamics  (Solomon  et  al.  2000).  The  model 
synthesises  the concept  of increasing  returns to  adoption and information diffusion  within 
social networks. Increasing returns to adoption stem from the benefits that consumers enjoy 
from  adopting  the same dominant design due to the positive externalities in common use 
(Arthur  1989).  Information  diffusion  processes  within  social  networks  capture  the  role  of 
word-of-mouth and demonstration effects among consumers regarding the properties of new 
products (Rogers 1962). Combining these two features of innovation in a percolation model is 
shown to be sufficient to replicate the aforemonetioned three stages of the product lifecycle.  
 
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we will first discuss the product lifecycle model and the 
empirical  insights  that  have  been  derived  from  it.  In  section  3  we  turn  to  the  standard 
percolation model. In section 4, we introduce increasing returns to adoption and competing 




2. The Product Lifecycle Model 
 
The product-life cycle concept was first developed as a concept in marketing in the 1960s 
(Klepper 1997: 146-147). In the 1970s, the concept was further refined into a stage model of 
industrial innovation (Utterback and Abernathy 1975; Abernathy and Utterback 1978). Three 
stages  are  generally  distinguished:  the  explorative  stage,  the  development  stage,  and  the 
mature stage. Williamson (1975: 215-216) characterized the three stages of development along 
a product lifecycle as follows:
1 
 
                                                        
1 As quoted in Klepper (1997: 146-147).   5 
“Three  stages  in  an  industry’s  development  are  commonly  recognized:  an 
early  explorative  stage,  an  intermediate  development  stage,  and  a  mature 
stage. The first or early formative stage involves the supply of a new product 
of relatively primitive design, manufactured on comparatively unspecialized 
machinery, and marketed through a variety of exploratory techniques. Volume 
is  typically  low.  A  high  degree  of  uncertainty  characterizes  business 
experience at this stage. The second stage is the intermediate development 
stage  in  which  manufacturing  techniques  are  more  refined  and  market 
definition is sharpened; output grows rapidly in response to newly recognized 
applications  and  unsatisfied  market  demands.  A  high  but  somewhat  lesser 
degree of uncertainty characterizes market outcomes at this stage. The third 
stage is that of a mature industry. Management, manufacturing, and marketing 
techniques all reach a relatively advanced degree of refinement. Markets may 
continue  to  grow,  but  do  so  at  a  more  regular  and  predictable  rate  … 
(e)stablished  connections  with  customers  and  suppliers  (including  capital 
market access) all operate to buffer changes and thereby to limit large shifts in 
market shares. Significant innovations tend to be fewer and are mainly of an 
improvement variant.” 
 
The theoretical contribution of the product lifecycle model lies not so much in its description 
of three stages of technological development, but in its explanation of the interplay between 
product innovation and process innovation. After an explorative period of product innovation, 
increasing  returns  to  adoption  render  one  design  approach  dominant  (David  1985;  Arthur 
1989).  Both  firms  and  consumers  incur  increasing  returns  from  adopting  a  single  design 
incorporating standardised features. Product standardisation in turn opens up opportunities for 
process innovation in large-scale production technologies. More efficient process technologies 
allow for lower sales price of the popular design, accelerating its dominance in the market. 
The  two  trends  of  product  standardisation  and  process  mechanisation  can  be  mutually   6 
reinforcing, which would explain the sudden transition from technological variety to product 
standardisation in what is called a “dominant design” (Abernathy and Utterback 1978). 
 
The first systematic empirical study of product lifecycles was carried out by Gort and Klepper 
(1982) and examined the history of 46 products using data on entry, exit, patents, prices and 
output, as well as counts of major and minor innovations. It can still be regarded as the most 
comprehensive  study  of  the  subject.  They  broadly  confirmed  the  basic  product  lifecycle 
pattern in terms of expanding output through falling prices and demand only saturating in the 
later  stages  of  the  product  lifecycle.  Using  the  distinction  between  major  and  minor 
innovation, they also found that, on average, the rate of major innovations peaked earlier than 
the  rate  of  minor  innovations.  In  so  far  as  major  innovations  can  be  considered  as  early 
product innovations, and minor innovations  as later incremental extensions of  a  dominant 
design, the results may be interpreted as consistent with the predictions of the product lifecycle 
model.  
 
The second systematic study of product lifecycles was done by Malerba and Orsenigo (1996), 
who speak of the Schumpeter Mark I regime when referring to the entrepreneurial stage of the 
product lifecycle, and the Schumpeter Mark II regime in referring to the mature oligopoly 
stage of the product lifecycle.
2 They distinguish 49 technological classes, which have been 
grouped according to classes of patent statistics. On the basis of this classification, they found 
that the majority of classes could be characterized as either Mark I or Mark II. The former 
group  contained industries  with  small-sized  firms,  high  entry,  low  concentration,  and  low 
stability  in the ranking  of  innovators  (the explorative  stage  in  the  product  lifecycle).  The 
second group contained industries with large firms, low entry, high concentration, and high 
stability in the ranking of innovators (the mature stage of the product lifecycle). In a follow-up 
study, Breschi et al. (2000) related the Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II regimes to 
                                                        
2 Malerba and Orsenigo (1996, p. 452) also recognised these similarities between their terminology and the product 
lifecycle.   7 
indicators that characterize the properties of the technology to test whether these patterns of 
industrial  organization  can  indeed  be  related  to  a  particular  stage  in  technological 
development. The  indicators include  the size of  technological opportunities, the  degree  of 
cumulativeness of innovations, the degree of appropriability of innovations, and properties of 
the knowledge base. Following the product lifecycle model, the Schumpeter Mark I regime is 
characterized  by  high  technological  opportunities,  a  low  degree  of  cumulativeness  and 
appropriability,  and  a  knowledge  base  predominantly  based  on  applied  science.  The 
Schumpeter Mark II regime is characterized by low technological opportunities, a high degree 
of cumulativeness and appropriability, and a knowledge base predominantly based on basic 
science. Breschi et al. (2000)  indeed  found that Schumpeter  Mark  I patterns of  industrial 
organization  can  be  explained  by  the  signs  of  the  four  indicators  characterizing  the  first 
regime, and that Schumpeter Mark II patterns of industrial organization can be explained by 
the opposite signs of the four indicators characterizing the second regime. 
 
Many other empirical studies have been carried out mostly focusing on specific products. In 
their reviews, Klepper (1997) and Murmann and Frenken (2006) conclude that, despite the 
growing body of empirical literature, systematic evidence on the product lifecycle model is 
still limited. This is due to the lack of common methodologies and definitions as well as a lack 
of formal models providing predictions of the specific innovation dynamics that are to be 
expected given particular sets of industry characteristics. 
 
In the following we propose a simple theoretical framework based on percolation models from 
complex  systems  theory.  The  model  simulates  the  explorative  stage  when  many  different 
designs are developed, the development stage when one dominant design emerges, and the 
mature stage when only incremental changes occur within the dominant design. The main 
contribution of the model is that is replicates the three stages of the product lifecycle as an 
outcome of a single elementary process. We do so by combining two concepts: technologies 
exhibit  increasing  returns  to  adoption  (Arthur  1989)  and  information  diffusion  among   8 
consumers within social networks (Solomon et al. 2000). The generality of the model can be 




3. Adoption as Percolation 
 
Economists have traditionally studied the choice behaviour of consumers as a rational choice 
process in which an individual consumer weighs the benefits and costs of alternative product 
bundles. Outside the field of theoretical economics, applied researchers as well as company 
managers  have  long  acknowledged  the  relevance  of  agent  interactions  in  understanding 
innovation diffusion. The owner of a given product is a powerful demonstration able to induce 
similar purchasing decisions by people in his or her social circle. Still, individual people also 
have personal preferences. The sports car used by a playboy, however attractive, may be of 
little interest to the father of four, or the new Internet-enabled mobile phone shown off by a 
jetsetting manager may not interest a housewife. A model of adoption should thus incorporate 
both individual preferences and social imitation. 
 
One  such  model  is  the  social  percolation  model,  which  makes  use  of  a  powerful  tool 
developed in mathematical physics and was recently introduced into the social sciences to 
model  diffusion  dynamics  (Solomon  et  al.  2000).  Percolation,  as  its  name  suggests,  was 
originally developed to analyse whether a material can be traversed by a fluid or not.  
 
In the model, we have agents connected by social relations to other agents. We assume the 
social network to be regular in that all agents are symmetrically connected to four neighbours   9 
on a lattice. This assumption is useful to avoid the possibility that certain model results are 
driven by the specific asymmetries in the network structure.
3 
 
Percolation in adoption means that an agent becomes aware of a novel product only when a 
neighbour buys it for the first time. At this moment, the agent considers whether to adopt 
him/herself.  That  is,  in  our  model  word-of-mouth  is  the  only  medium  for  agents  to  gain 
information  about  new  products.  Whether  the  agent  subsequently  adopts  the  product  is 
dependent on the agent’s preferences as indicated by its “minimal requirement”, a level of 
value-for-money below which the agent refuses to buy the product. Conversely, any product 
about which the agent becomes aware  with  a  value-for-money index  above the minimum 
threshold will be purchased. 
 
To assign preferences to  agents, we  follow the standard  percolation model in  assigning a 
random  number  drawn  from  a  uniform  distribution  on  the  interval  [0,1).
4  These  values 
represent the minimal requirement demanded by an agent before adopting the product. 
 
A  simulation  consists  in  assigning  a  product  an  exogenous  value-for-money  index  level, 
defined as a value q in the interval [0,1). The initialisation consists in choosing randomly a 
few agents, and offering them the product. They will buy it only if the value-for-money index 
q of the product is above the agent’s minimal requirement. For each subsequent simulation 
time step t the agents neighbouring those who made a purchase at t-1 will have the opportunity 
to buy a product, and the purchase will  be made only if the  product exceeds the agent’s 
minimal requirement. 
 
                                                        
3 The model set-up allows any network structure to be implemented. For example, network structures 
can  be drawn  from empirical  research  in  specific  product industries and can  reflect  quite  different 
topologies with properties such as small worlds or scale-free. 
4 Other distributions could of course be employed, such as lognormal to reflect income distribution (cf. 
Cantono and Silverberg 2008).   10 
A simulation run represents the diffusion of a novel product in a market. Clearly, all agents 
whose minimal requirements are higher than q will never buy it. However, it is also possible 
that agents with requirements lower than q will not adopt, because in the absence of previously 
adopting neighbours they never get a chance to evaluate the product. Since preferences are 
randomly drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [0,1), the maximum extent of 
diffusion of a product with value-for-money index q is exactly equal to q. For example, a 
product with q=0.9 will be adopted by at most 90 percent of all agents, since ten percent of the 
agents will have a minimum requirement exceeding 0.9. 
 
The mathematical properties of percolation models are such that there exists a critical value-
for-money index q* such that for product with values above q above the critical value q*, the 
diffusion rate will be close to their value-for-money index, and for values of q below the 
critical  value  q*,  the  diffusion  rate  will  be  significantly  lower  than their  value-for-money 
index. In the former case, information about the existence of the new product almost fully 
percolates through the social network thus triggering nearly all potential customers to adopt 
the  product.  In the  latter case  the  information  does  not  percolate,  causing  many  potential 
adopters not to adopt the product because they never become aware of it through contact with 
other adopters. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 report the diffusion of a product in a market consisting of 160,000 agents on a 
lattice of 400 x 400 cells.
5 The same results are obtained for lattice of different sizes. Dark 
cells are agents who did not buy the product, while brighter ones are agents who did. Both 
snapshots are taken at the end of the simulation runs, i.e., when no more purchases take place. 
In  both  cases  10  cells  selected  at random  are  initially  offered  the  opportunity  to  buy  the 
product, and then, in subsequent time steps, the model evolves iteratively as described above. 
 
                                                        
5 The model has been implemented in the Laboratory for Simulation Development (LSD) available via 
http://www.business.aau.dk/~mv/Lsd/lsd.html. See also Valente (2008).   11 
In the case reported in Figure 1 the product’s value-for-money index is set at q=0.55, below 
the  known  critical  value  threshold  for  two-dimensional  site  lattices,  q*=0.593.  As  can  be 
expected, only some of the initial agents buy the product. These early adopters manage to 
“infect” their neighbours, spreading the information about the existence of the novel product. 
But each of these cases hits, sooner or later, against clusters of too demanding agents, that is, 
agents  with  minimal  requirements  higher  than  the  product’s  value-for-money  index. 
Therefore, the diffusion of the products is stopped before the vast majority of agents have the 
opportunity to consider the product. Conversely, Figure 2 reports the same simulation when 
the product value-for-money index is set to q=0.6, above the critical value q*. In this case the 
diffusion of the product may be slowed by groups of highly demanding consumers, but the 
vast  majority  of  willing  consumers  have  the  opportunity  to  make  their  purchase. 
Consequently,  close  to  60  percent  of  all  consumers  will  adopt  the  new  product.  The 
simulations thus show that raising the value-for-money index of the product only slightly from 
0.55 to 0.60 leads to a sudden increase in the rate of the product’s diffusion, a phenomenon 
known in physics as a phase transition. 
 
The  phase  transition  property  of  percolation  to  produce  a  qualitative  change  in  system 
behaviour above the critical value is well known and was employed by Solomon et al. (2000) 
in a model of product adoption as a hit or flop phenomenon. The percolation model thus 
explains the fine line between success and failure of new products, and the inherent difficulty 
for  firms  to  predict  success  and  failure.  In  the  following  section  we  extend  the  standard 
percolation model to include increasing returns and competing technologies, as a model of the 
product lifecycle. 
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4. The Model 
 
What is characteristic of the product lifecycle model is the sudden emergence of a dominant 
design. David (1985) and Arthur (1989) suggested that the emergence of a dominant design, 
which  often  takes  the  form  of  a  technological  standard,  is  due  to  increasing  returns  to 
adoption. The benefits of adopting a new technology increase with the number of adopters due 
to lower prices resulting from scale economies for producers and higher utility, due to wider 
availability of complementary products. Even though these benefits are diverse, we capture the 
increasing returns in our value-for-money index q. 
 
In  the  following,  we  assume  that  there  are  several  technologies  competing  on  a  product 
market, with each technology being offered by a single firm. We further assume that their 
value-for-money index q is not fixed (as in the original percolation model), but increases as a 
function of the number of adopters as follows: 
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where qi,t is the value-for-money index of product i at time t; Ni,t-1 is the number of adopters of 
product i at time t-1; k and a are positive parameters.
6 
 
We set the initial value-for-money index levels, qi,0, for all products identical and to a value 
well below the critical value q* so that we know the market will not be automatically invaded. 
Yet, as early adopters generate increasing returns and thus raise the product’s value-for-money 
                                                        
6 These parameters govern the “speed” of reaction of quality to the increment of number of adopters of a given 
product. Setting different levels for these parameters allow us to increase or decrease the effects of new consumers 
on product quality, as well as change the shape of the relation. The effect of these parameters also depends on the 
extent of the market considered, i.e., the number of agents.   13 
index endogenously, the market may eventually be invaded. We can observe something akin 
to a network externalities effect: the higher the share for one specific product, the higher will 
be its rate of growth of value-for-money index, thus allowing for still higher sales growth in 
the future. Since all products are initially identical in terms of their value-for-money index, 
any product can, by pure chance, attain an early advantage that competitors have no way of 
overcoming later. 
 
In assuming that products compete on the market and differ solely in value-for-money index, 
we abstract from substitutability between products. In general, different products, however 
distinct in their specific characteristics, can nonetheless be compared along some dimensions 
in characteristics space (following Hotelling 1929). We assume products to be ranked along a 
single, unspecified variable, so that products closer in their ranks are considered more similar 
than products with very different ranks. The ranking variable is independent of the value-for-
money index variable, which evolves with the increasing returns function as described above. 
 
The ranking variable can be interpreted as a stylised representation of different technological 
patterns, or paradigms, where nearby products have more similar technological characteristics 
then far away products. Any product has the possibility to be developed to provide higher and 
higher value-for-money index. However, consumer behaviour can restrict the technological 
area that is actually explored, because only through adoption the value-for-money index of a 
product will be improved as specified in formula (1). 
 
From our model, it follows that an agent who is informed by a neighbour about the existence 
of a new product, is actually informed about the existence of the particular variant of the 
product that the neighbour purchased. If the agent then decides to purchase the new product, 
the agent will adopt the same product variant as its neighbour, or – as we will assume – a 
variant technologically similar. This widening of options can be considered as reflecting the   14 
fact that choices of agents are only partially influenced by their peers. We modify agents’ 
behaviour  as  follows.  Once  an  agent  considers  buying  a  product  with  rank  r  (because  a 
neighbour bought it the previous period), he will choose among all products with rank between 
r - t and r + t, where t is a non-negative integer. Of these products, all of those with a value-
for-money  index  below  the  agent’s  minimal  requirements  are  removed  from  the  list  of 
potential  choices.  Among  the  remaining  ones,  probabilities  of  being  chosen  decrease  the 
farther the products rank differs from r. The probability is controlled by a parameter bÎ[0,1] 
in that for  each product whose  rank  i is in  the range 
τ   from  the “triggering” firms  r we 
compute  the  indicator 
| | i r
i x
- = b .  The  probability  of  being  chosen  is  then  this  indicator 












Figure 3 reports the total number of agents adopting each of the ten products over time for an 
example run, while figure 4 shows the lattice for the same run. The model starts with a small 
percentage  of  all  the  agents  that  choose  randomly  one  product.  These  initial  purchases, 
scattered across the lattice, then triggers the process of diffusion. 
 
We first analyse the results for t = 0, thus assuming that consumers purchase the exact same 
products as their peers. The results in figure 3 and 4 show that increasing returns do play a 
crucial role in determining the overall success of the introduction of a new product, but also 
influence the eventual structure of the market, in terms of which agents choose which product. 
Our results show that earlier fluctuations may generate one single firm dominating the whole 
market, or a few of them reaching a level of qi sufficient to expand in smaller niche areas of   15 
consumers’ space. In this manner, we can not only replicate the outcome of the lock-in model 
of Arthur (1989)
7, but also produce different competing dominant designs among different 
clusters  of  consumers.  The  same  results  are  obtained  with  different  parameter  values  and 
across different runs. For example, if the initial value-for-money index level qi,0 is even lower 
than 0.3, it simply takes longer before the dominant design emerges. And, if k is higher, the 
dominant design emerges quicker.  
 
Figure 4 shows a run of the model in three dimensions (market share vs. time and firms 
offering  a  ranked  product).  Initial  value-for-money  index  is  low  (qi,0=0.1)  reflecting  the 
embryonic stage of product development at the start of a new product lifecycle. The low initial 
value-for-money index means that only a few, rare, consumers make a purchase, and generally 
no neighbour actually follows this lead. For presentation purposes, we show the simulation 
results from step 100 onwards, because during the initial period of 100 iteration steps, no 
product manages to gain more than a few consumers.  Over time, there will be one design 
profiting from the increasing returns, thus increasing its value-for-money index and appealing 
to the majority of consumers. This sudden transition is reflected in the rapid increase in the 
market share of a particular product. After the dominant design emerged, however, products 
that are similar to the dominant design also become popular due to the fact that consumers do 
not necessarily perfectly imitate the product purchased by their neighbours as reflected in a 
positive value of tau (t = 1). 
 
To understand the evolution of the variety of designs in a more precise manner, we computed 
the entropy of the market shares of the 100 products in Figure 5 as well as the total number of 
adopting agents. Entropy here reflects the variety in designs.
8 The figure shows that entropy 
during the initial period of limited diffusion is very high.
9 The high level of variety can be 
                                                        
7 A similar model has recently been proposed by Hohnisch et al. (2006). 
8 Entropy is a measure of variety and is given by H = -
Σ
si log2 (si) where si stands for the share of 
product i in the population of products. 
9 Considering that the maximum entropy for 100 products equals log2 (100) = 6.64.   16 
understood from the random drawing of agents and products. In the second stage, entropy falls 
as a single cluster starts to dominate the market as increasing returns set in. During this phase, 
the dominant design emerges and a mass market is created. In the final stage, the dominance 
of the most popular product diminishes as similar products are being purchased as well. In this 
mature phase, the dominant design is still in place, but has taken the form of a family of 
similar  products.  The  emergence  of  a  family  of  products  is  indeed  in  accordance  with 
empirical evidence as summarised by Murmann and Frenken (2006). 
 
The model also replicates two other stylised facts (Rogers 1962). The adoption curve in Figure 
5 is S-shaped, which is typical for innovation diffusion processes. Second, it takes a long time 
for a new product to diffuse after it is introduced. For example, before cars became mass 
products, they were used for decades only by a small group of people. 
 
If we further assume that each product variant is produced by a different firm, the entropy 
curve in Figure 5 reflects the evolution of market structure as well. The sudden drop in entropy 
reflects the sudden dominance of one or few firms, leading to an industry shake-out as it is 
common in product industries (Klepper 1997). The slight increase in the number of producers 
after the dominant design emerges, reflected by the slight increase in entropy in the final 
phase, is also confirmed by empirical evidence that in maturing markets, remaining niches 
become filled by small niche players (Carroll and Hannan 2000). 
 
The  patterns  shown  in  Figures  4  and  5  are  robust  across  simulations,  yet  which  design 
becomes the dominant design is indeterminate. Thus, one can explain the general pattern of 
product evolution without being able to predict which of the 100 designs will become the 
dominant design (David 1985; Arthur 1989).  
   17 
The qualitative pattern reflecting the three-stage development of the product lifecycle shown 
by the simulations is also robust against changes in the parameter values of b and t.
10 The 
possible values of b lie between 0 and 1, where the simulation results that are shown, are 
generated for b=1. Lowering the value for b yields a similar pattern of development, though 
narrowing  the family  of  firms  composing  the  dominant  design.  The  parameter  t can  only 
assume positive integer values, where the simulation results shown, are generated for  t=1. 
Increasing t to 2, 3 or 4 yielded the same qualitative pattern, generating larger “clusters” of 
technologies  in  the  dominant  design,  while  further  increasing  t would  be  theoretically 
unrealistic. 
 
The range of k-values that produces the product lifecycle pattern is more limited. This can be 
understood on the basis of the model formulation itself. Given that we assume very low initial 
value-for-money index levels (qi,0=0.1), a too low value for k will not trigger a sufficient 
amount of increasing returns, so that a dominant design will not emerge. Such low values can 
be associated to invented products that fail to diffuse. A too high value of k, by contrast, will 
immediately lead to a dominant design as the increasing returns rapidly increase the value-for-




6. Concluding Remarks 
 
Using  only  a  few  assumptions,  the  theoretical  model  replicates  the  three-stage  product 
lifecycle  model  developed  by  Abernathy  and  Utterback  (1978).  The  first  stage  in  the 
theoretical model is characterized by a high level of variety of different products, each with its 
own small clusters of like-minded agents that are socially connected (‘niches’). This stage 
                                                        
10 Results can be obtained upon request.   18 
corresponds to the explorative stage in the product lifecycle theory. In the second stage, one 
design suddenly emerges, thereby reducing variety and making the product available for the 
mass market. This stage corresponds to the development stage of the product lifecycle during 
which a dominant design emerges. And, assuming single-product firms, the occurrence of a 
dominant design also leads to an industry shake-out. In the third stage, small modifications of 
the  dominant  designs  are  being  explored  incorporating  only  minor  modifications  of  the 
dominant design. This stage corresponds to the mature stage of the product lifecycle during 
which the dominant design is elaborated in different variants.  
 
The main contribution of the model is that is replicates the three stages of the product lifecycle 
as an outcome of a single elementary process, while also producing the S-curve of product 
diffusion and the industry shake-out. The model can be easily adapted to account for more 
specific dynamics characterizing individual product technologies. For example, we did not 
consider the case in which consumers repurchase the product several times in their lifetime 
(which might reinforce the dominance of the dominant design as consumers abandon their 
initial choice and follow the crowd later on). For  many products this is a relevant factor. 
Another possible modification of the model is to allow for multi-product firms. 
 
For  individual  industries,  empirical  evidence  on  product  lifecycle  patterns  and  industry 
dynamics might be used to validate the theoretical model empirically in specific contexts. We 
leave this for future research. 
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Appendix - Figures 
  
 
Figure 1.  Diffusion for a single product with value-for-money index q=0.55 on a square lattice 
containing 400 x 400 points and initialising 10 randomly chosen cells. Lsd configuration file: 




Figure 2.  Diffusion for a single product with value-for-money index q=0.6 on a square lattice 
containing 400 x 400 points and initialising 10 randomly chosen cells. Lsd configuration file: 
SIM2.LSD. 




Figure 3.  Time series for number of adopters among consumers on a 400 x 400 lattice of 10 





Figure 4.  Lattice of adopters among consumers on a 400 x 400 lattice of 10 different products. 




Figure  5.    Time  evolution  of  market  shares  for  100  ranked  products.  Consumers  form  a 
400x400 lattice; t=1 and b=1; initial price-performance index qi,0=0.1; a=0.2 and k=1; initial 




Figure 6.  Total number of consumers who adopted a product and entropy values. On the 
vertical  axis  the  upper  values  refer  to  the  number  of  adopters  and  the  lower  figures  in 
parentheses refer to the entropy measure. Parameter values for the simulation are as described 
in Figure 5.   27 
Appendix – Model Description 
The model has been implemented using Lsd, and is available upon request to replicate the 
results presented in the paper or test other configurations. 
The model contains a set firms, assigned some parameters, like an initial value-for-money 
index and a ranking index. The model includes several routines computing accounting values 
and the consequential upgrade of the value-for-money index, as described in the main text. A 
routine Init perform some general initializations at the starting of a simulation run. The main 
steps of a simulation cycle are composed by three variables: Action, Choose and Spread. 
Init is used only to create the model’s data structure and is executed only at the first time step 
of  the  simulation.  It  generates  several  matrices  concerning  descriptive  states  for  the 
consumers. In particular, one of these matrices describes the states of the consumers which 
may be one of the following three values: currently using a product; considering the purchase 
of a product; unaware of the existence of such products. The Init routine sets all consumers to 
the  state  “unaware”,  but  for  a  small  number  (as  defined  in  the  model  configuration)  of 
randomly chosen consumer that are set to “considering”. 
The routine Action scans all consumers. Those marked as “considering” are evaluated by the 
routine  Choose.  If  this  routine  returns  a  positive  value  (i.e.  they  actually  purchased  a 
product),  then  the  same  consumers  are  evaluated  by  the  routine  Spread.  For  consumers 
marked  as  “unaware”,  the  routine  Action  draws  a  random  variable,  which,  with  a  small 
probability, switches their state as “considering”. 
Routine  Choose  applies  to  a  specific  consumer  that  is  evaluating  whether  to  make  a 
purchase.  The  routine  considers  the  products  consumed  by  the  four  neighbours  of  the 
evaluating consumer. One of these products (randomly chosen, if they are more than one) is 
selected as “focal” product. If no neighbouring consumer is actually using any product, or, in 
general,  if  the  evaluating  consumer  was  not  put  in  state  of  “considering”  by  the  routine   28 
Spread, the focal product is chosen randomly among all existing products. The routine then 
assigns the probability of products to be chosen, in the following way. The routine assigns an 
index 1 to the focal firm, say having rank r. For all firms with rank i within a range 
τ  from the 
focal firm, the probability index is 
β
|i-r|. All firms are then assigned a probability index zero if 
scoring a value-for-money measure below the threshold of the evaluating consumer, or if they 
have a ranking further than 
τ  from the focal firm. If no firm remains with positive probability, 
the routine returns a null code, and the evaluating consumer is re-set to the “unaware” state. 
Otherwise, the positive probability indexes are normalized, and a random choice according to 
these indexes is performed. In this latter case, the chosen firm is assigned a new consumer, the 
evaluating consumer is set to the state “using a product”, and the product’s code (a positive 
value) is returned to the calling routine Action.   
 
The routine Spread is activated on a specific consumer. All the neighbours of this consumer 
are set to the state “considering”, signalling which product has been just purchased by the 
consumer specified for the routine. The consumers set in this state at time step t will activate 
the routine Choose only at time step t+1. 